Suddenly, the Monroe Doctrine is everywhere again. A foreign‑policy
statement from 1823 is being invoked in 2026 as if it cleanly maps onto today’s
geopolitical landscape. The enthusiasm is striking—and worth unpacking.
Where It All Began: 1823 and the “Era of Good Feelings”
President James Monroe first outlined what would later be called
the Monroe Doctrine in his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. The
United States was still basking in the glow of the so‑called “Era of Good
Feelings,” a moment of national pride following the War of 1812. Americans
believed they had won a decisive victory. In reality, the war ended in a
stalemate. Britain, exhausted by decades of conflict and focused on rebuilding
after the Napoleonic Wars, simply agreed to peace. No borders shifted. No major
policies changed.
James Monroe
Still, symbolic triumphs—Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory on Lake
Erie and Andrew Jackson’s dramatic win at New Orleans (fought after the peace
treaty had already been signed)—fed a powerful national myth that outpaced the
facts.
A Hemisphere in Flux
Meanwhile, much of Central and South America had recently broken
free from European colonial rule. These new nations were fragile, indebted, and
vulnerable. U.S. leaders feared that instability or default might tempt
European powers to return.
Monroe’s message was direct: any attempt by European nations to
colonize or interfere in the Western Hemisphere would be considered a threat to
U.S. peace and security. The doctrine was reactive—if Europe interfered, then
the U.S. would respond.
At its heart, the Monroe Doctrine was meant to shield the
sovereignty of newly independent nations. Monroe believed that keeping Europe
out would benefit U.S. economic interests, but those interests were secondary,
not central, to the doctrine’s purpose.
A Doctrine the U.S. Couldn’t Enforce
In practice, the Monroe Doctrine was more aspiration than
enforceable policy. The United States lacked the military strength to back it
up, and European powers knew it. Their disregard was obvious:
- 1833: Britain
reclaimed the Falkland Islands.
- 1838–1850: France—and
later France with Britain—blockaded Argentina’s Río de la Plata and Buenos
Aires.
- 1861: While
the U.S. was consumed by the Civil War, Spain reoccupied Santo Domingo and
France invaded Mexico, installing a Habsburg emperor.
Only after the Civil War did the U.S. begin enforcing the doctrine
more assertively, supporting Mexico’s resistance to French occupation. This
marked the start of America’s rise as a hemispheric power—but decades of
inconsistency had already damaged trust across Latin America.
Theodore Roosevelt Rewrites the Rules
In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt dramatically reinterpreted
the Monroe Doctrine. What had been a defensive warning became an offensive
justification for intervention. The Roosevelt Corollary argued that if Latin
American nations failed to maintain order or repay debts, European powers might
intervene—so the United States should intervene first.
- Dominican
Republic (1905–1924): U.S. control of customs houses,
followed by occupation.
- Nicaragua
(1912–1933): U.S. Marines intervened to crush a
revolution and stayed for two decades.
- Haiti
(1915–1934): U.S. forces occupied the country
after the assassination of its president.
These interventions deepened resentment throughout Latin America.
FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: A Different Vision
In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt charted a new course by
rejecting the Roosevelt Corollary and introducing the Good Neighbor Policy. FDR
pledged non‑intervention, mutual respect, diplomatic engagement, and cultural
exchange. This shift ended routine U.S. military occupations and opened the
door to more cooperative hemispheric relations.
The timing proved crucial. During World War II, the Good Neighbor
approach helped unify the Americas. Most Latin American nations aligned with
the Allies, provided essential raw materials such as rubber, hosted strategic
bases, and curtailed Axis influence. A region once wary of U.S. power became a
network of indispensable partners.
The Cold War Ends the Good Neighbor Era
The Cold War quickly unraveled the Good Neighbor Policy. As anti‑communist
containment became the overriding priority, earlier commitments to sovereignty
and non‑interference faded. The United States resumed overt and covert
interventions across Latin America:
- Guatemala
(1954) – CIA‑backed overthrow of President Jacobo Árbenz.
- Cuba
(1961–1962) – Bay of Pigs invasion and the
Cuban Missile Crisis.
- Brazil
(1964) – Support for a military coup against President João
Goulart.
- Dominican
Republic (1965) – Deployment of 22,000 Marines to
suppress an uprising.
- Chile
(1973) – Support for the coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to
power.
- Operation
Condor (1970s–1980s) – U.S. intelligence cooperation
with South American dictatorships.
- Nicaragua
(1981–1990) – Funding the Contras, leading to
the Iran‑Contra scandal.
- Grenada
(1983) – Invasion to remove a Marxist junta.
- Panama
(1989) – Invasion to arrest General Manuel Noriega.
The hemisphere once again became a battleground for U.S. strategic
priorities.
2025–2026: A New Corollary Emerges
In December 2025, the Trump administration introduced what it called the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. The policy seeks to reassert U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere and claims the right to intervene to prevent “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets”—and asserting that it “supersedes” the original Monroe Doctrine.
“To supersede” means “to take the place of”—and the term fits,
because the Trump Corollary diverges sharply from Monroe’s original intent. The Monroe Doctrine centered on protecting
the sovereignty of Western Hemisphere nations. The Trump Corollary prioritizes
“America First” national security interests over the territorial and political
autonomy of neighboring states. It asserts that the U.S. no longer extends unconditional respect for the sovereignty of regional partners. The Trump Corollary also explicitly links
national security to U.S. access to the natural resources of Western Hemisphere
nations, framing economic extraction as a condition of American security—an
approach far removed from Monroe’s defensive posture.
Which Monroe Doctrine Are We Talking About?
The Monroe Doctrine has never been a fixed idea. It has been
reinterpreted, stretched, and repurposed for two centuries—sometimes as a
shield against European imperialism, sometimes as a justification for American
intervention, and sometimes as a diplomatic olive branch. The 2026 revival
raises an important question: are we witnessing a return to Monroe’s original
vision, or the emergence of something entirely new?
History suggests that every generation remakes the doctrine to fit
its own anxieties and ambitions. The real issue, then, is not whether the
Monroe Doctrine is “back,” but which version of it policymakers are choosing to
resurrect—and what that choice reveals about the future of the Western
Hemisphere.
